two hundred years (Battie 17581) and is now generally acknowledged. Psychiatric casualties take up more doctor time and hospital beds than any other and consume a larger slice of the national drug bill. It is also the most exciting because it has the greatest potential for advance. It should be the most satisfying because it deals with illnesses which affect patients as persons. Diagnosis demands expert medical and neurological knowledge. Management calls the psychiatrist's own personality into play. To look after patients discarded by colleagues and society he needs symptom-tolerance. He must not regard them as a challenge to his therapeutic prowess, or see his role to normalize the abnormal. He must be able to take long-term medical and social responsibility. Yet psychiatrists attract ridicule and suspicion and psychiatry mediocrities and cranks. It is still in its silly season of theories and therapies. Much of it remains remote from the mainstream of medicine. Futuristic hypotheses and medieval attitudes coexist in apparent harmony. Psychiatrists divide into schools according to whether their orientation is somatic or psychological, eclectic or analytic, and how they treat their patients. There is no general body of knowledge onwhich all agree. Erroneous theories create their own false facts and jargon. These are fortified by statistics, glossed with esoteric speculation 'This and subsequent references are quoted from Hunter & Macalpine (1963) unless otherwise specified and paraded as complexity. So-called formal presentations, diploma examinations and longwinded textbooks manage to make the subject unreal, not to say dull. Sections on pathogenesis read like nineteenth century accounts of general paralysis before the spirochmte was seen in the brain (Noguchi & Moore 1913) or of phthisis, for that matter, before the tubercle bacillus was discovered (Koch 1882). By then both had their predisposed personalities; body types; positive family histories; sex, marital status and social class ratios, as well as supporting apparatus of multifactorial emotional and physical causation.
Psychiatrists do not diagnose their patients like other doctors do. They discard four of their senses and literally play it by ear. It is the no-touch technique adapted to new purpose. Physical examination and laboratory investigation, which transformed medicine from guess-work and theory to fact and science, are spumed or positively discouraged. It is alleged that they deflect attention from study in depth of the patient's mind, and impede rapport. Presenting symptoms are elevated to the status of a disease like varieties of fever were in the eighteenth century. The pharmaceutical industry provides corresponding antidotes and reinforces the illusion. The patient who feels anxious is labelled anxiety state; the lethargic, worried or depressed, depression; the behaviour disordered is called a psychopath; and the bizarre schizophrenic. Would-be psychiatrists are taught to describe, define and treat disembodied psychosyndromes instead of learning to apply modern investigative science to finding causes. Doubts are expressed whether the medical model of cause and effect, which is basic to every advance in the understanding of disease, applies. Psychiatric illness is supposed to result from nonspecific stress acting on the presumed predisposed. Patients are characterized by epithets which insult their personality and intelligence. Their sufferings are denied by being described in terms of 'will not' -eat, swallow, walk, cooperate, control excretion, &c., where body doctors would say 'cannot' and try to discover why. No other specialty blames illnessand therapeutic failureon patients. Psychiatrists need to be reminded that not even the mentally sick are ill for fun or refuse to get better to annoy their attendant.
Case 1 A 16-year-old girl was sent to a mental hospital after smashing the family television set. She had been difficult, bad-tempered and under child guidance for years, labelled a psychopath. Her stepfather and an older sister in a subnormality hospital were blamed as the cause. Routine physical examination on admission showed stigmata of tuberous sclerosis. Lumbar air encephalography revealed obstructive hydrocephalus. Her behaviour had deteriorated because her cerebral ventricles, in particular the temporal horns, were blowing up. Treatment was by ventriculo-caval shunt. Her mother who had had years of electrical tieatment and pills for 'depression' was found to suffer from the same condition. So did her sister when she was examined. A maternal uncle had fits and was included in a genetic study of 'epilepsy and schizophienia' because of his peculiar personality. His skull X-ray and EEG were normal but on re-examination he was found to have a typical lumbar shagreen patch.
These four members of one family between them covered almost the whole range of psychiatric symptomatology and had been diagnosed accordingly. Yet they were suffering from one and the same condition. Their psychosyndromes were determined by site, size, and effect on surrounding structures of lesions in the brain. Being situated centrally they affected personality and behaviour, not motor or sensory function. No amount of psychotherapy could have uncovered the cause nor physical treatment so-called remove it.
It is curious that patients are sent to physicians for diagnosis but to psychiatrists for treatment. Even stranger is the fact that psychiatrists remain content with this lowly role originally allotted to their 'antimaniacal' predecessors. Had they used their eyes instead of their ears, this familyand the public pursecould have been spared years of wasteful and harmful psychiatric attention. In medical practice the pathological process causing symptoms and signs is pin-pointed by an exercise known as differential diagnosis. In psychiatry it is almost unknown except of one psychosyndrome from another, neurosis from psychosis, depression from schizophrenia. Not surprisingly agreement is low. Everyone finds what he is looking for. This is also the reason why psychiatric case reports often reveal more of observer than observed, and type of questions to patients more than their answers.
It is general experience that patients may run through the gamut of psychosyndromes in the course of one illness. A girl was labelled a psychopath in her teens when she had a couple of illegitimate children and came in conflict with the law. In her 20s her illness was called depression, then schizophrenia, and treated according to the rules. Eventually in her 30s choreoathetotic movements previously called mannerisms made the diagnosis of Huntington's chorea obvious and this was confirmed by family history and outcome.
Case 2 An immigrant girl of 19 complained of frightened feelings. She was given anti-anxiety pills and a social worker to help her with the complexities of London life. She became dispirited and slow. Antidepressants were added to her medication. She began to have bizarre experiences and developed strange ideas to explain them. Finally she became socially incapacitated and was sent to a mental hospital as a 'depressed and anxious schizophrenic unresponsive to drugs'. Physical examination was negative, blood tests and EEG were normal. Skull X-ray showed a flake of suprasellar calcification. Drainage of a craniopharyngioma followed by radiotherapy cured the 'psychosyndrome' by relieving pressure on the floor of the third ventricle and surrounding basal structures.
In this case diagnosis by the unaided senses was impossible. The whole illness was played out in mental symptoms. Even her visual fields were spared. It shows how little sense there now is in drawing a line between 'functional' and 'organic' psychoses, least of all by the time-honoured triad of gross brain diseasedementia, paralysis and fitsdating from the earliest days of neurology. Many diseases are ushered in by a lowering of vitality which patients appreciate as irritability and depression. The mind is the most sensitive indicator of the state of the body. An abnormal mental state is equivalent to a physical sign of something going wrong in the brain, at least as significant and far commoner than an extensor plantar response, that sheet anchor of neurological signs. Like it, type of mental disturbance also has localizing value. To exclude patients who have no physical signsthat is no motor or sensory deficitfrom the benefit of modern scientific medicine is today perhaps the most stultifying single factor retarding psychiatric and indeed neurological progress.
Cerebral tumours are not common. They probably make up no more than a small percentage of psychiatric case material, but their presence and location can be proved beyond dispute. Much more often similar symptoms are produced by inflammatory or degenerative conditions affecting the same sites. As yet only time and neuropathological examination can demonstrate their existence with certainty. Long-stay patients in mental hospitals provide a unique and challenging opportunity for such correlative clinico-pathological studies. Because advances in neurological diagnostics have been most spectacular in tumour identification, there is a tendency to regard the exclusion of tumour as the end-point of neuro-psychiatric thinking. The notion that mental symptoms imply mind disease led to tragic consequences in the following case. By the time the cause of her psychiatric disorder was looked for she had been taken right through the psychiatric nomenclature and pharmacopoeia and recovery was impossible.
Case 3 A woman of 28 had peiiodic headaches from the age of 14. The family was comfortably off and her mother fussy. The practitioner diagnosed migraine. At 21 she married and soon after had the first of seven breakdowns which each time took her into a psychiatric unit. Asked to account for her nervous state, she told of her husband's impotence. Her illness was called an anxiety state and blamed on him. The second breakdown coincided with divorce proceedings. The cause was regarded as obvious. Remarriage was followed by the third. She now complained of her second husband's sexual demands. Reactive depression was diagnosed and treated, as was the fourth which followed separation. The next episode came without the patient being able to give a reason and was accordingly called endogenous depression for which she was given ECT. In subsequent attacks she became demanding, demonstrative, suicidal and bizarre. Labels like hysteria, psychopathy and schizophrenia were heaped on her. Finally she was referred to her area mental hospital. She was perplexed and reduced. There were no abnormal physical signs. Routine skull X-ray showed calcification deep in the right (minor) hemisphere in the parietal region. A tumour was confirmed by gamnma-scan. At operation a partially calcified meningioma was removed. It weighed 120 grams and filled ahout one-eighth of the cranial cavity.
A dominant hemisphere lesion in the same region would have produced earlier and more marked intellectual loss and so would have led to earlier search for what was making her ill. The episodic nature of the illness was due to intermittent intracranial pressure changes and masked her gradual intellectual deterioration. As one would expect, the more marked the mental disturbance the fewer the neurological signs, and vice versa. Psychiatrically noisy, neurologically silent, is no bad adage.
Patients and relatives confuse the history of their illness with what they think made them ill. So do doctors. Some even encourage this confusion by questions like: 'Why are you depressed ?' Nobody would ask a patient why he suffered from, say, pneumonia, or put the slightest credence on what he volunteered as the cause. Yet in psychiatric practice this is the rule. If a cause which seems sufficient in the enquirer's scheme of things is given, the illness is labelled reactive, that is psychogenic or situational; if not, it is called endogenous. This unfortunate term implies that the cause of the illness is not known and not worth looking for. It blocks etiological thinking and opens the way for blunderbuss shock and drug treatments.
Historical Origins
The earliest physicians did not reify mental symptoms into mental diseases. On the contrary, they regarded them as valuable adjuncts to physical diagnosis. When prominent, diseases were named after them, for instance typhoid fever because of its characteristic clouding of consciousness. Hippocrates taught that a mental disturbance was no more divine or supernatural in origin than any other disorder of bodily function, whether it was paroxysmal (epileptic) or persistent (phrenetic). Galen's theory of humours and passions, temperaments and complexions, naturals and non-naturals, provided a complex physio-pathological system which explained disease before a single cause in the modern sense was known, as interaction between constitution and environment. Patients received the same treatment whatever ailed them. Sixteenth and seventeenth century textbooks of medicine were arranged by anatomical region. Mania and melancholia, raging and quiet madness, were grouped under affections of the head between sore eyes and sore throat, and alongside migraine, vertigo, catalepsy, stupor, coma, apoplexy, palsy (including shaking palsy), falling sickness (epilepsy), 'memory lost' (dementia), cramp and nightmare (Barrough 1583). Patients were sent to Bedlam, the prototype mental hospital, not because their illness was thought to be mental, that is in the mind, but if it made them socially intolerable. In the popular imagination 'madness' came to be equated with violence and the stigma of social disgrace rubbed off on those who looked after them. Robert Burton's 'Anatomy of melancholy' (1621) exemplified the romantic view of mental illness which takes the patient's preoccupations as the explanation of his illness. Love melancholy (erotomania) was the commonest because sexual centres are often excited in illnesses which disturb mental function. Next in frequency came the religious and hypochondriacal varieties. This is how patients introduced sex to psychiatrists, not the other way round as is generally assumed by those not familiar with earlier psychiatric history. The exchange of delusions between doctor and patient is a two-way affair. Episodic disturbances not explicable on humoral theory remained apart as the wandering womb syndrome or hysteria, socalled because of the associated panic feelings rising from abdomen to throat and head (Jorden 1603). Most are readily recognizable as minor or temporal lobe epilepsy, some were akinetic, cataleptic or narcoleptic attacks. Purcell's 'Treatise of vapours, or hysterick fits' (1702) makes the identification clear. The fact that attacks are commoner in women for biological reasons connected with reproductive function also explains why the psychiatric patient came to be referred to as 'she'. In Victorian times there was a tendency to call hysterical every sign or symptom which medicine could not explain. Thomas Willis, assisted by a uniquely gifted research team including Richard Lower and Sir Christopher Wren, described the anatomy of the brain (1664), coined the word 'neurologie' (1667) and correlated paralysis and dementia with lesions in the brain (1672). The new order of nervous disorders replaced humoral doctrine. Mental maladies were explained in terms of a literal tension and relaxation of nerve fibres (Robinson 1729). Cheyne (1733) taught the public that they had 'nerves'. Flemyng (1740) called hypochondriac and hysteric disorders 'neuropathies'. By the end of the century all psychiatric disorders (including amentia, dementia, mania and melacholia, and embracing also Linne's group of mentales and Vogel's paranoiae) were subsumed in Cullen's (1784) classification as a new order of 'neuroses'. Feuchtersleben (1845), Viennese poet-physician, popularized 'psychosis' because it allowed for the operation of psychological factors. Both terms survive although without sense or substance. Stripped of the theoretical superstructure built on them in the last hundred years, they tell us only whether an illness is or is not socially acceptable. The old asylum wall served the same purpose (Macalpine & Hunter 1955) .
When Battie (1758) divided 'madness' into 'original' and 'consequential', he foreshadowed the present-day division of psychoses into functional or endogenous, and organic. In his time most cases were 'original' because medicine knew few diseases and little of any cause. Battie's list was limited to injury, intoxication, fever, stroke and 'a lunatic ancestry'. Today thorough investigation reveals a sufficient physical cause for the abnormal mental state in the majority of patients admitted to a district psychiatric hospital. Every medical advance increases knowledge of diseases which may affect the brain and so derange the mind. Progress in psychiatry is inevitably and inexorably from the psychological to the physical never the other way round. Most of it has come in the last fifty years and was undreamed of in the decades 1890-1910 when Kraepelin, Freud and Bleuler laid the foundation of present-day psychiatric classification and thinking. It is difficult to picture how primitive their medical knowledge was. They had no laboratory tests, no X-ray, no EEG. They knew nothing of so common a cause of mental disturbance as vascular disease due to hypertension because the sphygmomano-meter had not come into clinical use. Whole groups of disorders like vitamin deficiency, endocrine, metabolic and autoimmune diseases remained to be discovered. Large areas within the brain were unexplored. There was no neurone theory, no concept of chemical transmitters in the nervous system. How nonsensical it is to hold to a classification dating from those prescientific days is shown by the example of general paralysis. Kraepelin (1909) diagnosed it in one-third of his patients before the spirochiete was discovered (Schaudinn & Hoffmann 1905 ) and a laboratory test for syphilis became available (Wassermann 1906) , after which his number fell to around 5 %. Another example of how psychiatry advances with advances in medicine is the case of George III (Macalpine & Hunter 1969) . His own doctors argued whether it was 'original' or 'consequential'. In the nineteenth century it was reckoned he had attacks of mania because he was excited. This century his illness was classified as manicdepressive psychosis on the single criterion of recovery and recurrence. Psychoanalysts on their part saw it as a series of psychological breakdowns and divined that his personality was vulnerable and conflict-ridden. In fact he suffered from attacks of a widespread metabolic disorder affecting the nervous system of which the mental manifestations were the most alarming because regally incapacitating.
Cortex
It had been realized since the seventeenth century that dementia was associated with cerebral atrophy. The cortex came to be regarded as the seat of mental activity. Early in the nineteenth century Drs Gall and Spurzheim suggested that it was composed of separate cerebro-mental organs each subserving a specific function. Bell's (1811) demonstration of one-way traffic in the nervesefferent and afferent, gave the search for localized centres in the brain a scientific basis. The first fruit of the phrenological doctrine was Broca's (1861) discovery of the cortical area for motor or spoken speech. From 1863 Hughlings Jackson began to map out the motor cortex and describe temporal lobe symptomatology by inspired observation of focal paralysis and fits. Neurology grew from psychiatry as an independent specialty devoted to the paralysed and the epileptic, that is to sufferers from primarily motorcentral, spinal and peripheralas opposed to mental, disorders.
The cortex made neurology but failed psychiatry. Kraepelin set his assistant Alzheimer to find in it the neuropathology of dementia praecox. He discovered instead a case with previously undescribed morbid histological appearances (Alzheimer 1907) (1) characteristic attitude offlexion, (2) in a 'state ofecstasy' (from Scholz 1892) . Today the diagnosis ofencephalitic parkinsonism with oculogyric crisis would be made presenile dementias. Because examination of the cortex drew a blank, it was assumed that the brain was not the seat of psychosis, at least not at the cellular level. Biochemists began to explore the possibility of intoxication at the molecular level. Psychiatrists parted from medicine and turned to the mind, tempted by the new schools of psychodynamics. Disappointed again, they took up shocking treatments without regard to etiology or pathogenesis.
Basal Ganglia By the time the epidemic of lethargic encephalitis in the wake of World War I had demonstrated the importance of the basal ganglia, hypothalamus, midbrain and brainstem in mental, motor, autonomic and endocrine function (Economo 1918 (Economo , 1929 , psychiatryand neurologyhad gelled. Like many a commonplace of modern medicine the concept of noncortical, extrapyramidal disorders of muscle and mind (Stertz 1921) , first broached in Wilson's (1912) striatal syndrome, emerged twenty-five years after Kraepelin's and ten years after Bleuler's formulations. That abnormal posture and movement accompany mental disturbance had been observed for centuries and is remarked in the earliest descriptions. 'Arms cross'd, brows bent, eyes fix'd, feet marching slow' (Churchill 1761) was the poet's picture of melancholy. Their significance was stressed by Kahlbaum (1874) who described them under the name of catatonia. Before they made neurological sense in the wake of lethargic encephalitis, they were endowed with psychological meaning and regarded as physical expression of an abnormal mental or emotional state. Neurologists too had to revert to the mind to account, for instance, for the tremor of parkinsonism, the commonest extrapyramidal syndrome, because search of the cortex revealed little or no abnormality, and subcortical centres were unknown. Gowers (1893) likened it to that of fright and for this reason attributed parkinsonism to 'prolonged anxiety and severe emotional shock'. Psychosis Bleuler's (1911) schizophrenia concept, implying a literal splitting of mental functions accompanied by withdrawal from reality, was in essence an attempt to transplant catatonic phenomena into the psychological sphere and explain them in terms of conflict, complexes, symbolism and fantasy. What he described were acute and chronic dystonic and dyskinetic syndromes and hypothalamic disturbances, with or without temporal lobe involvement, and cerebral defect states. He interpreted akinesis as autism; akinetic and cataleptic attacks as thought-blocking, negativism and ambivalence; facial amimicry as lack of affect; absence of associated movements as mental rigidity; attitude of flexion as an attempt to minimize contact with the outside world, and stupor (sometimes prefixed by 'hallucinatory') as its total exclusion. Higher level language disorders became thought disorder; oculogyric crises, states of ecstasy (Fig 1) . Even (Jones & Hunter 1969) . In one-half of these they amount to ongoing or post-encephalitic parkinsonism with fiexion, rigidity and tremor. In others abnormal posture and movement of the choreo-athetoid series predominate, and in some they are combined. The progression from marked mental to marked motor disorder can be accelerated reversiblyfor a time at any rateby drugs of the phenothiazine group, the chemical strait-waistcoat of modern psychiatry. The fact that the major impact of lesions is subcortical explains also why patients by and large are not paralysed or demented in the classical neurological or cortical sense, although their brain is affected. It is telling confirmation that mental hospital patients all over the world have a generic similarity, even in pictorial records of the past (Fig 2) . This can hardly be explained as the effect of the same conflicts and complexes, but only on the basis of common motor behaviour.
The concept of psychosis or schizophrenia is a historical accident. The abnormal mental state is not the illness, nor even its essence or determinant, but an epiphenomenon. Had the epidemic of encephalitis broken out only ten years earlier, or had its manifestations in endemic form been recognized for what they were, psychiatry would look very different today.
